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Reflective mirrors: Perspective-taking in autoscopic phenomena. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.īrugger, P. Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical remembering. Berlin: Springer.īerntsen, D., & Rubin, D. Cognitive Systems Research, 9, 33–51.īernecker, S. A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory. In each case, it is argued that visuospatial perspective in personal memory should be distinguished from other kinds of perspective such as kinesthetic perspective and emotional perspective.īarnier, A. Yet field perspectives tend to be treated as privileged also in the domains of memory for skilled movement, and memory for trauma. Since field perspectives in personal memory are also likely to be the product of constructive processes, we should reject the common assumption that such constructive processes inevitably bring distortion and error.
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It argues that Richard Wollheim’s related distinction between centred and acentred memory fails to capture the key phenomena, and criticizes Wollheim’s reasons for doubting that observer ‘memories’ are genuine personal memories. This paper analyses the distinction in personal memory between such external observer visuospatial perspectives and ‘field’ perspectives, in which I experience the remembered actions and events as from my original point of view. Sometimes I remember my past experiences from an ‘observer’ perspective, seeing myself in the remembered scene.